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Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop 
3.1  Introduction 
3.1.1  Capital Flows in the 1990s 
The surge in capital flows toward a group of developing countries in the 
1990s is remarkable more because of the nature of these flows than their 
quantities. Total lending to developing countries has indeed increased 
compared to the mid-l980s, but is not higher than in the early 1980s. Fig- 
ure 3.1 shows the current account and net capital flows as a fraction of 
gross domestic+product  (GDP) for seventeen emerging market countries.' 
Net errors and omissions have been included in the capital account. This 
figure describes the broad trend seen over the last two decades: large cur- 
rent account deficits during the late seventies and early eighties, followed 
by  a sharp decline in net capital flows to approximately zero in the mid- 
1980s, and subsequently another net foreign lending boom. 
Philippe Bacchetta is director of Study Center Gerzensee (a foundation of Swiss National 
Bank) and professor of economics at the University of Lausanne. Eric van Wincoop is senior 
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Part of this paper was written while the first author was visiting the NBER in Cambridge. 
The authors thank Sebastian Edwards, Stijn Claessens, Holger Wolf, and John Clark for 
discussions at an early stage, and Laura  Brookins for research assistance. The views ex- 
pressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. 
1. This group of countries is determined by  data availability and is used throughout the 
paper. They include most major recipients of  recent capital  flows, except for China. The 
seventeen countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Venezuela. The data for this and the other illustrative figures in the paper involving capital 
flows are from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics. 
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During the previous foreign lending boom of the late 1970s, commercial 
bank lending to developing country governments, firms, and banks was 
most important. The recent lending boom of the 1990s was quite different 
in nature. Instead of direct lending to developing countries, portfolio flows 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) became the dominant source of cap- 
ital  inflows. The governments of  developing countries have  also come 
to rely more on issuing debt securities than on foreign commercial bank 
loans. Most commercial bank lending to developing countries now goes 
directly to the private sector, often channeled through banks and other Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility  63 
financial institutions. Moreover, syndicated bank loans have become far 
less important (see Chadha and Folkerts-Landau 1999). 
These stylized facts are illustrated in figure 3.2. The figure breaks down 
capital flows into four components. The first is FDI, which has been by 
far the smoothest of all components. It rose from about 0.5 percent of 
GDP in the early 1980s to almost 1 percent of GDP  in 1996. The second, 
portfolio flows, is associated with trade in equity and debt securities. Net 
portfolio flows rose from practically zero in the mid-1980s to almost 4 per- 
cent of GDP  in 1993. These flows have been very volatile as well, dropping 
to less than 1 percent of GDP in 1995 as a result of the Mexican crisis, and 
rising again to 3 percent of GDP in 1996. 
The remaining components are classified under “other investment” by 
the International  Monetary Fund (IMF): loans, currency and deposits, 
and trade credits. For illustrative purposes we have broken “other invest- 
ment” up into two components. The first, “nonportfolio net private flows:’ 
are net flows to the private sector other than portfolio and FDI flows. The 
debt crisis of the early 1980s was marked by a sharp drop in net “nonport- 
folio net private flows” from 3 percent of GDP in 1981 to -2  percent of 
GDP in 1983. Since the mid-1980s these flows have slowly increased again 
as confidence was restored and the old debt restructured. The second com- 
ponent, “nonportfolio net government flows,” are net flows to the govern- 
ment sector other than portfolio flows, including official loans. These have 
clearly declined since the early 1980s. During the 1990s total net nonport- 
folio flows, while volatile, have been close to zero on average. 
The remainder of the paper will focus on capital inflows rather than net 
flows. As il1ust;ated  by figure 3.3, almost all the action is associated with 
inflows. Outflows have been relatively steady at a level fluctuating between 
zero and 1 percent. Their recent increase may even be overestimated since 
capital flight seems to have declined (see Schineller 1997). The story of net 
capital flows is therefore almost entirely a story of capital inflows. 
3.1.2  Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility 
What are the factors behind the increase in lending to emerging econo- 
mies? This question is crucial  as its answer will  determine whether the 
flows pouring into emerging economies can be sustained, and thus be used 
for their long-term development. It will  also help in adopting the right 
policies in the shorter run. Should these flows be only temporary, they 
would be of little use for these countries and only create short-run policy 
management problems. The first empirical studies attempting to uncover 
the factors causing the increase in flows found that low real interest rates 
in developed countries play  a substantial role.2 This evidence led some 
2. See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996) and Frankel and Okongwu (1996) for sur- 
veys of these earlier studies. A  Net Foreign Direct Investment/GDP  of 17  emerging markets 
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analysts to conclude that the increase in inflows to emerging market coun- 
tries was temporary and would decline with the subsequent increase in 
world interest rates. Developments in more recent years have shown this 
prediction to be incorrect. 
Our contention is that there is one fundamental factor behind the in- 
crease in capital inflows to some developing countries: the wave of finan- 
cial liberalization and structural reforms undertaken  in recent years in 
emerging as well as industrialized countries. The changes in emerging mar- 
ket countries include the removal of capital controls, the liberalization of 
the domestic financial system, trade liberalization, macroeconomic stabil- 
ization, and privatization. Obviously, the dates, the extent, and the pace 
of  liberalization differ across countries. Typically, liberalization measures 
were adopted progressively over several years. Moreover, most countries 
only liberalized partially. For example, Korea kept many restrictions in fi- 
nancial markets. Its partial liberalization measures, however, led to a surge 
in borrowing by domestic banks and, to a lesser extent, in some categories 
of portfolio flows. 
Nevertheless, there is a clear trend toward liberalization in the  1990s. 
For example, an indication of capital account liberalization can be found 
by  using the capital controls index computed by  Bartolini and Drazen 
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strict ion^.^ Figure 3.4 shows the average of  this index for the seventeen 
emerging economies we consider. The degree of capital controls increased 
in the early 1980s only to decline dramatically in the 1990s. The profile of 
the capital controls index is strikingly similar to net lending depicted in 
figure 3.1. 
It is also useful to put developments in emerging markets into perspec- 
tive  against  the  background  of  increased  integration  of  industrialized 
countries. During the 1980s and 1990s we  have seen a substantial increase 
in equity and bond flows among industrialized countries. This process, 
known as “securitization,” is a result of domestic and international finan- 
cial  deregulation,  financial innovation,  and  technological  advances  in 
communication and c~mputing.~  Nonetheless portfolio flows to emerging 
markets have grown even faster. Of total FDI plus portfolio outflows from 
the sum of twenty-one industrialized countries, we find that 2 percent was 
allocated toward our seventeen emerging markets in 1986 and 1987. This 
increased to an average of 16 percent during the 1990s. 
Although the impact of the various reforms is not yet well understood, 
several studies have focused on equity markets and financial liberaliza- 
3. We  would like to thank Leonard0 Bartolini for providing the data. See Bartolini and 
4. For further discussion on these developments, see World Bank (1997, ch. 2). 
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ti~n.~  In particular, Henry (2000b) analyzes a group of eleven countries (a 
subset of our seventeen countries) and shows empirically that stock mar- 
ket liberalization has a significant positive impact on private investment. 
In a related paper, Henry (2000a) shows that equity prices significantly 
increase after a stock market liberalization. He also finds, however, that 
other economic reforms have an impact of the same order of magnitude. 
More specifically he constructs indexes of four types of reforms: macro- 
economic stabilization, trade liberalization, privatization, and easing of 
exchange controls. This evidence shows that it is necessary to consider the 
set of all liberalizations and reforms to understand the recent develop- 
ments (see also Bekaert and Harvey 1997). In this paper we  will  not at- 
tempt to disentangle the various liberalizations or reforms and simply as- 
sume that they jointly increase returns and give easier access to financial 
markets of these countries. 
The increased attractiveness of emerging markets to foreign investors 
obviously preconditions  the potential impact  of  other  factors.  For ex- 
ample, external developments such as movements in world interest rates 
are likely to have a larger impact on these economies. Domestic economic 
events will also have wider consequences. Thus, capital flows potentially 
become more sensitive to other variables and more volatile. Moreover, 
since the liberalizations represent in principle a permanent change, the 
increase in inflows should be  seen as ultimately permanent. This should 
allow for an easier financing of emerging countries’ development. 
If one adopts the view that domestic liberalizations and reforms play a 
central role in the recent lending boom, it is important to understand their 
impact in both the short and the long run. One can easily think of a series 
of  highly relevant questions: How much foreign capital can developing 
countries expect to receive in the long run? When are capital inflows “too 
large”? Is there a risk  of  sharp reversal in flows? Will  volatility decline 
over time? 
Before we  attempt to address these questions, it is useful to consider 
figures 3.5 through 3.7 as they provide some interesting insights into the 
discussion. Figure 3.5 compares the cumulative inflows from 1989 to 1996 
of individual countries. For each country it shows its fraction of total 
cumulative inflows to all the  seventeen emerging market countries and 
compares it to the country’s share in the 1992 capital stock of all seventeen 
countries6 When we  look at total inflows, the countries that have experi- 
enced large inflows in comparison to the relative size of their capital stock 
are Argentina, Thailand, Korea, and Mexico. These countries have all ex- 
perienced serious recent crises associated with a sharp drop in inflows. At 
5. Stulz (1999) provides a nice survey. See also Bekaert (1995), Bekaert and Harvey (1997), 
6.  The capital stock data is computed by updating the estimates of King and Levine (1994). 
and Henry (2000a, 2000b). 
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Note: The figure shows the share of capital outflows from twenty-one industrialized coun- 
tries going to the seventeen emerging markets. 
the other extreme of the spectrum is India, whose capital stock is about 
20 percent of the total emerging market capital stock, but whose inflows 
are only slightly over 5 percent of total inflows as a result of capital con- 
trols. When we  only consider FDI plus portfolio flows,’ Korea and Thai- 
land have experienced “normal” inflows. These two countries received rel- 
atively large inflows to the banking sector, and faced reversals of  these 
flows in 1997. It seems indeed that countries with large inflows tend to ex- 
perience sharp corrections.* 
Figure 3.6 shows the share of capital outflows from the sum of twenty- 
one industrialized countries that goes to the seventeen emerging econo- 
mies. The straight line represents our estimate of the steady-state inflows 
based on a model that we develop in section 3.4. It corresponds to a sce- 
nario whereby the emerging markets are equally well integrated into world 
capital markets as the industrialized countries. In the 1990s emerging mar- 
ket countries have received somewhat less than 20 percent of total capital 
outflows from industrialized countries, which is similar to the peak during 
the previous lending boom. FDI plus portfolio flows peaked at 26 percent 
7. Since most of FDI consist of equity claims above 10 percent of a firm’s value, we add 
8. See Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1997) for an econometric analysis of the determinants 
them to portfolio flows. 
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of industrial country outflows during 1994, which is even slightly above 
our long-run steady-state estimate and far above the peak during the pre- 
vious lending boom. On average, though, both portfolio and total flows 
during the 1990s remain below their long-run steady-state level. 
Figure 3.7 presents the data in figure 3.6 on a country-by-country basis. 
For a particular country i,  it shows the fraction of capital outflows from 
all other countries that is allocated to country  i.  Several conclusions can 
be drawn from these illustrations. First, inflows are highly volatile at the 
country level. Second, in many countries inflows overshoot our estimate 
of steady-state flows in some years. Third, in most cases the end of the over- 
shooting period coincided with a crisis. This is particularly the case for 
Chile and Mexico in the early 1980s and for Mexico, Thailand, and Korea 
in the 1990s. Finally, we observe the overshooting for all different types of 
capital flows. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico experienced sharp reversals 
of portfolio  flows. Peru experienced a sharp reduction  in FDI flows in 
1995. Thailand and Korea faced a large drop in loans and deposits to 
banks and other financial institutions during 1997. 
The countries that have experienced overshooting of capital inflows are 
also the ones where we have seen substantial capital account and financial 
liberalization. Argentina is an example of a country that liberalized capital 
flows at an early stage. Since 1989 foreigners may invest in Argentina with- 
out prior approval, on the same terms as investors who are resident  in 
Argentina.9 Capital flows to Argentina have been substantially above the 
long-run steady-state level since 1990. In Thailand major capital account 
liberalization measures were undertaken during 1990-92.lO  Direct invest- 
ment was encouraged, new closed-end mutual funds were established, tax 
incentives were'granted to foreign mutual funds for investment in the stock 
market, and authorities approved the establishment of the Bangkok Inter- 
national Banking Facility, which expanded short-term inflows. It is indeed 
during this period that we see a sharp increase in capital flows to Thailand, 
reaching above the long-run steady-state level. Korea has maintained sig- 
nificant capital account controls throughout  the sample. The liberaliza- 
tions have been very gradual and selective. In 1992 nonresidents were per- 
mitted limited access to the stock market and the limit on foreign direct 
investment was increased. In 1996 nonresidents were permitted to invest 
in domestic bonds through country funds. It has also become easier to 
attract short-term bank deposits from foreigners. Because the liberaliza- 
tions were more limited and gradual, we see smaller overshooting of capi- 
tal inflows than in countries that have more aggressively liberalized the 
capital account. Finally, there are countries such as India, Malaysia, South 
9. See the 1990 and 1991 issues of Exchange Arrangements and  Exchange Restrictions by 
10. See Johnston, Darbar, and Echeverria (1997) for details. 
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Africa, and Sri Lanka whose capital markets remain largely closed to for- 
eigners and where capital flows in the 1990s stayed significantly below the 
long-run steady state. 
3.1.3  A Simple Framework 
The above evidence shows that beside the general increase in capital 
flows to emerging market countries, there is a complex dynamic process. 
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on this process. More spe- 
cifically, we  address three issues: (1) What causes the overshooting? (2) 
Why can high volatility be associated with a period of liberalization? (3) 
How large can capital flows to developing countries be in the long run? 
Since the impact  of the liberalizations and structural reforms on the 
dynamics of capital flows has not been examined carefully in the previous 
literature, we  study the implications of a simple dynamic model. We first 
consider a model in which the liberalization is completely deterministic. 
In other words, investors know when and how much emerging capital mar- 
kets open up and macroeconomic reforms are adopted. This leads to port- 
folio adjustments and gives rise to a nonlinear relationship between capital 
flows and liberalization, with overshooting as a central feature. The non- 
linear relationship between fundamentals and capital flows makes analysis 
of sustainability even more difficult than usually thought.” 
We  subsequently introduce incomplete information, from the point of 
view of foreign investors, about the extent of liberalization and economic 
reforms. Since the structural changes happening in reforming countries 
drastically alter the economic environment and since these countries may 
be new  to inve,stors, information  on  investment  opportunities  is  often 
greatly limited. We argue that this incomplete information and the subse- 
quent process of learning may have a substantial impact on the dynamics 
of  capital inflows and can generate high volatility, consistent with  that 
observed in the data. We illustrate this point by incorporating learning in 
our dynamic model and by simulating it. 
Finally, we modify our model to examine the steady state. We compute 
some heroic estimates of long-run capital inflows in a world where emerg- 
ing markets are “equally” integrated into world capital markets as indus- 
trialized countries. 
Several explanations have been proposed in the literature to explain the 
volatility of capital flows, in  particular  in the context of the Southeast 
Asian crisis. These explanations rely on multiple equilibria, herd behavior, 
bubbles, or even irrational behavior. In contrast, our analysis shows that 
a simple macroeconomic model with optimal portfolio decisions can ex- 
plain several important features of capital flows. Nevertheless, our focus 
11. See Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) for a discussion of sustainability. 78  Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop 
on the impact of liberalizations is compatible with other approaches and 
should be seen as a complementary view. 
3.2  A Model of  Capital Flows 
The impact of liberalizations and reforms is a complex issue that has 
been analyzed from different perspectives. McKinnon (1993) provides an 
interesting overview of many of the issues. In this paper, we argue that the 
dynamic implications of these structural changes are nonlinear and can 
explain some of the volatility of capital flows. Our approach is somewhat 
related to that of Bacchetta (1992), who uses an overlapping generation 
model to look at a joint liberalization of capital flows and of the domestic 
financial  system.  The  latter  is  represented  by  a  reduction  in  margins 
charged by the domestic financial system that implies both an increase in 
return to domestic savers and a decrease in the cost of capital for firms. It 
is shown that a joint liberalization generally leads to an initial period of 
large net capital inflows. Over time, however, net inflows decline and may 
be replaced by net outflows. Moreover, there is an overshooting in share 
prices.  Nevertheless,  Bacchetta’s analysis  only  considers  a  small  open 
economy, does not incorporate uncertainty, and only analyzes once-and- 
for-all liberalizations. 
In this section, we consider a world economy with an arbitrary number 
of developed and emerging economies. We introduce uncertainty and the 
explicit portfolio decisions of investors.I2  We analyze both once-and-for- 
all and gradual liberalizations and study the impact on the dynamics of 
capital inflows. We  also examine the impact of liberalization  occurring 
simultaneously in all emerging markets. On the other hand, to keep the 
analysis tractable, we introduce some simplifying assumptions. In particu- 
lar, we  abstract from intertemporal consumption  decision^'^ and assume 
that there are no capital outflows from emerging  market^.'^ We  also as- 
sume that capital can be costlessly moved across countries, although we 
do introduce an adjustment cost reflecting bottlenecks. Most of these as- 
sumptions can be relaxed in more complex and realistic models without 
altering the basic insights. 
3.2.1  Basic Setup 
Assume that the world is made up of N identical developed countries 
and J identical emerging economies. There is one capital good, which can 
12. Calvo and Mendoza (1996, chap.  1 in this volume) also consider explicit portfolio 
13. Thus, we do not consider consumption booms that have been observed in some coun- 
14. Figure 3.3 shows that this is not a bad approximation as most of the increase in the 
decisions in a model of international capital flows. 
tries. 
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be invested in any country. At time 0 individuals in developed and emerg- 
ing economies own respectively W*  and  W capital goods. While capital 
goods depreciate at a constant rate 6, each year individuals receive a new 
endowment of capital goods equal to 6W* in developed countries and 
6 Win emerging economies. Thus the endowment of capital goods in each 
country remains constant over time. The capital goods are lent to firms 
that produce a nonstorable consumption good in the following period. 
Firms have a random technology and shocks are country specific. Individ- 
uals receive the consumption good in proportion to their investment and 
consume it. Hence, this economy does not allow intertemporal substitu- 
tion and individuals simply maximize each period the risk-adjusted return 
from their investment. This allows us to focus on the portfolio diversifica- 
tion aspect of capital flows to emerging markets. 
It is assumed that emerging-country individuals invest only in domestic 
firms, while rich-country investors can diversify internationally. Allowing 
emerging-country  residents  to hold  well-diversified portfolios does not 
qualitatively alter the results. It is therefore a simplifying assumption that 
allows us to focus on capital inflows, and, as figure 3.3 shows, it is also 
broadly consistent with the data. The return on investment in developed 
country  i is p:  -  N(jX*, u*’). This means that with capital stock  pro- 
duction of the consumption good is F.,TKT.  The return rrf  on investment in 
emerging market i is composed of three elements: 
YE,  =  Ft, - T,,  - 44)> 
and the expected return is F,  = ji -  T~,  -  c(ZJ.  The variable pZf  -  N(F, a’) 
denotes the return from firms’ production. We denote the correlation be- 
tween returns in two countries by  pEE for two emerging economies, pDo 
for two developed economies, and pED for a developed and an emerging 
economy. A tax T,~  is imposed on foreign investors. This tax captures the 
various barriers or costs to investment faced by investors (capital controls, 
illiquid markets, taxation, etc.). A liberalization is simply modeled by  a 
decrease in T,,. 
Finally, there is an installation cost c(ZJ  that is incurred when the capi- 
tal stock is increased. A major element influencing capital inflows is that 
the liberalizing economies have difficulties absorbing large flows for vari- 
ous reasons. There may not be an efficient structure to channel funds to the 
most productive  uses, in particular  because of a weak financial system 
or thin markets.I5 Other reasons include incomplete information, lack of 
infrastructure or skilled labor, and various other bottlenecks. Without an 
installation cost the portfolio adjustment in response to a change in the 
tax is immediate. This would lead to an excessive, and unrealistic, realloca- 
15. Gavin and Hausman (1996), World Bank (1997), and several others stress the role of 
weak domestic financial markets. 80  Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop 
tion of resources between developed and emerging countries in response 
to a shock. We assume c(1j = cZ,  with c being a constant.16 
Asset prices also fluctuate in presence of the installation cost c(1). If we 
interpret p -  T  as the return on installed capital, one can show that the 
price of installed capital in emerging market i minus the price of installed 
capital in industrialized  countries, both at time t - 1, is  equal to c(1J 
discounted at the implicit risk-free interest rate. An investment boom in 
emerging markets therefore leads to a rise in the relative price of emerging 
markets’ capital. Asset price booms and busts associated with foreign cap- 
ital inflows and outflows are indeed commonly seen in emerging markets 
and play a particularly important role in the Asian crisis. For simplicity, 
however, we do not introduce asset prices explicitly. 
The basic decision variable is the proportion aLr  that an individual in 
a rich country invests in country  i.  When the investment allocations are 
determined, the capital stock in emerging country i is given by 
(1)  Kt,r  =  W +  Nq,W*, 
while investment is given by 
A liberalization, captured by a decline in T~~,  implies a change in portfolio 
allocations qr  and consequently in investment and the capital stock. 
3.2.2  Portfolio Allocation 
It is first necessary to derive the optimal portfolio allocation before de- 
termining Ithe capital stock, investment, and capital inflows. Since there is 
no intertemporal allocation, individuals from developed countries max- 
imize their utility each period through the optimal investment allocation 
across countries. Assuming an exponential utility function U(C)  = cRC, 
and given that consumption is equal to portfolio return R, times W*,  rich- 
country investors’ optimization problem is 
maxE(R,j - Yvar(R,),  2 
OJf  (3) 
where 
16. We  could  also make the installation  costs a function of  IIK.  But  qualitatively this 
makes no difference for the results. We  could have added an installation cost to the return 
in developed countries as well, but again omit it for the sake of simplicity. What is important 
is that the bottlenecks are greater for emerging markets than for industrialized countries. Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility  81 
The appendix derives the optimal investment allocations. Here we  only 
consider  the case where the correlation of  returns  across all countries 
is zero and u = u*.  The average expected return in emerging markets is 
denoted 7, = C~=,Bjf/J.  Then, the investment share in emerging countryj  is 
given by: 
'If  IN+  J'f  '  1 
The portfolio share depends on the expected excess return between emerg- 
ing country j and the world return (equally weighting all countries). 
The impact of a liberalization can readily be derived from equation (4). 
If the liberalization occurs in countryj  only we find: 
as =-  N+J-  1 
371  (N  + J)yu*' 
aaJ  =  N 
37,  (N  +  J)yu* 
If the liberalization occurs simultaneously in all emerging economies: 
~- 
Obviously the impact is larger when a country liberalizes alone because it 
has fewer competitors for the foreign capital. The difference increases with 
J. To attract a certain amount of foreign capital, the incentive to liberalize 
is greater the larger the number of other emerging countries that open up 
their markets. A larger reduction in T is needed. 
3.2.3  The Dynamics of Capital Flows 
Once portfolio shares are known, capital flows can be derived. First 
consider the case where all countries liberalize simultaneously and have 
the same T~,  = 7,. In that case we can write: 
(5) 
where xo  = 1/(N + J)  and x,  = N/[(N  + J)yu2].  Using the definition of 
B,, the evolution of the capital stock is given by substituting equation (5) 
into equation (1): 
(6) 
Here we used the fact that all emerging countries have the same investment 
rate. Combining with equation (2) gives us a stable linear difference equa- 
tion for the capital stock: 
a,r  =  x,  +  XI(< - F*), 
- 
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(7) 
where 
N(x, +  x,(.  - .*))W*  +  W - Nx,W*T, 
1 +  Nx,W*c 
f(T,> = 
is a negative function of  7,. Since investment by domestic residents is a 
constant 6 W  capital inflows are equal to total investment minus 6 W Using 
equation (2) this gives 
We can use these equations to determine the impact of a joint liberaliza- 
tion. We  will  also consider the case where only one country liberalizes. 
The equations are qualitatively similar. Assuming that the average tax rate 
across all emerging markets remains constant, it follows from aggregating 
equations (l), (2), and (4)  that the aggregate capital stock, investment, 
and 7,  remain constant. In that case, from equation (4), 
- 
(9)  aj,  =  x2 + x3(<, - p*), 
where 
Substituting equations (9) and (2) into equation (l), the differential equa- 
tion for the capital stock, and equation (8) for capital inflows, remain un- 
changed, with x,, x,, and T, replaced by x2,  x,, and T,,. 
3.2.4  The Response to a Financial Liberalization 
The dynamic impact of a liberalization  can readily be derived. From 
equation (7) a permanent financial liberalization, as captured by a perma- 
nent decrease in the tax rate T,,,  leads to a gradual rise in the capital stock 
to a higher level sincefi~,)  increases. From equation (8) it follows that 
there will be an immediate rise in capital inflows, followed by  a gradual 
decline to a higher steady-state level. Capital inflows therefore overshoot 
their new steady-state level after a liberalization. It can be easily verified 
that the overshooting is smaller, although more persistent, when the instal- 
lation  cost  is  larger. The  precise  dynamics  of  capital  flows  obviously 
changes with the form of installation costs, but even with a nonlinear cost 
function the qualitative results are the same. 
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very realistic. First, as we  argue in section 3.1, it is a combination of vari- 
ous liberalizations and reforms that  makes investment more attractive. 
They typically do not occur simultaneously. Second, even specific reforms 
are often gradual. For example, consider the stock market liberalizations 
that have been analyzed empirically. A useful measure of the stock market 
openness to foreign investors is the investability index computed by  the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). For each stock an investability 
index between 0 and 1 is computed, measuring the ease with which foreign 
investors can buy and sell the stock. The aggregate investability index is a 
weighted average of the index for each stock, with weights based on mar- 
ket capitalization. This index has been used in particular by Bekaert (1995) 
and Henry (2000a, 2000b) to measure liberalization. Figure 3.8 shows the 
evolution of this index for a subset of six countries." While stock market 
liberalizations in  Chile, India, and Mexico can best be characterized as 
once-and-for-all permanent liberalizations, those in Brazil, Pakistan, and 
Venezuela are more gradual. 
Consequently it seems interesting to consider a gradual liberalization. 
The dynamic impact of such a liberalization obviously depends on its pro- 
file over time. In the next subsection we  calibrate the model and numeri- 
cally simulate a simple gradual liberalization. 
3.2.5  Numerical Simulation 
The gradual liberalization we  consider is  the case where the tax rate 
declines exponentially. We assume that 7, decreases at a rate of 10 percent 
per year: 7, = e--O.ItT0. We  set the model parameters as follows. First u = 
0.05 is the average standard deviation on a broad measure of capital return 
for the four industrialized countries in Baxter and Jermann (1997). Such 
a broad measure of capital return is not available for emerging markets. 
Harvey (1995) reports average returns on equity for industrial countries 
and emerging markets. The latter is on average 80 percent larger, so that 
we  set u* = 0.09. We set p = 0.07, and p* = 0.106 is set such that invest- 
ment in emerging markets by  industrialized countries is zero before the 
liberalization. The assumed correlations are pE. = 0.06, pED = 0.12, and 
pDD = 0.35. These are based on correlations for equity returns reported by 
Harvey (1995). We set W = 1 and W* = 4. This reflects the fact that per 
capita capital stock in industrialized countries is  on average about four 
times that of  emerging markets.'s We  set the number of  developed and 
emerging countries, N and J, both equal to 20. This implies that emerging 
markets hold 20 percent of global wealth. This corresponds closely to the 
share of emerging country capital stocks in the global capital stock. We 
set y such that the rate of relative risk-aversion is 3 at the preliberalization 
17. The other countries have either fewer observations or little change in the index. 
18. This is based on the 1992 capital stock data discussed in section 3.1. BRAZIL 
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Fig. 3.9  Dynamic response to gradual liberalization 
average level of industrial country consumption. The adjustment cost pa- 
rameter c is set at 0.05. Finally, we  set 6 = 0.07 to be consistent with the 
depreciation rate assumed by King and Levine (1  994) to compute the capi- 
tal stock data we  use. 
Figure 3.9 shows the dynamic response of capital inflows relative to the 
capital stock when the tax rate decreases exponentially at a rate of  10 
percent per year, starting from a rate T~  of 0.05. The figure shows both the 
case where only one country liberalizes and where all emerging market 
countries liberalize. We clearly see an overshooting of the inflows in both 
cases. The basic economic intuition is that there is a portfolio adjustment 
that needs to take place once the tax rate drops. This is a stock adjustment 
that requires relatively large flow adjustments in the short run. Foreign 
investors buy a lot of emerging market equity in the short run to raise 
exposure to that part of the world. Once most of the portfolio adjustment 
has taken place, the portfolio flows decline. If the full liberalization takes 
places instantaneously (permanent drop in the tax rate), inflows overshoot 
immediately and then gradually fall back to their higher steady-state level. 
In figure 3.9 portfolio flows rise during the first five years, after which they 
gradually decline. The gradual rise of portfolio flows before they peak is 
a result of the gradual liberalization. As discussed above, capital flows rise 
more when only one country liberalizes. The difference is larger for the 
new steady state than for the short-run response. In the short run there 
are high adjustment costs, which prevent excessive overshooting. 
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specific profile assumed for 7,. Other profiles obviously give different dy- 
namics, but an overshooting is generally present. This overshooting is con- 
sistent with the data presented in figure 3.7. This result has potentially 
important implications. First, it shows that capital flows may be falling 
even when fundamentals are improving. Second, it shows that periods of 
large inflows and investment are likely to be followed by a downward cor- 
rection.I9  This implies that periods of large inflows cannot be extrapolated. 
This considerably complicates policy decisions as they must take into ac- 
count a potential future reversal. Edwards (chap. 7 in this volume) ana- 
lyzes in detail the policy issues associated with overshooting. Third, the 
overshooting of capital flows will also give rise to an overshooting of asset 
prices because, as discussed above, the price of installed capital depends 
positively on the rate of investment. Asset price overshooting after a burst 
of capital inflows is commonly observed in emerging markets. 
3.3  Incomplete Information and Learning 
A crucial element in liberalization and reforms is incomplete informa- 
tion. Since the environment changes dramatically, investors do not have 
immediate full information on their new investment opportunities. The 
problem of incomplete information is likely to become less acute over time, 
however, as investors learn about their new environment. In this section we 
show that the presence of incomplete information can generate considerable 
volatility. We also argue that it can explain contagion across countries. 
Incomplete information is obviously a pervasive phenomenon,  but it 
can be far more acute in the case of liberalizing emerging economies. For- 
eign investbrs may have less information than domestic investors as these 
markets are new to them,20  and there may only be incomplete information 
available to domestic investors and entrepreneurs. Further, there may be 
a large degree of uncertainty about how firms will succeed in the new en- 
vironment. Bacchetta and Dellas (1997) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) 
consider examples where entrepreneurs are uncertain about their chances 
to succeed after a trade liberalization. Substantial liberalization and mac- 
roeconomic reforms imply a regime change. This creates an environment 
of uncertainty for foreign and domestic investors alike. Particularly in the 
beginning there is uncertainty both about the extent of the reforms and 
their success. In time, however, investors will learn and most of the initial 
uncertainty will be 
19. Notice that this is also consistent with the evidence present by  Milesi-Ferretti and 
Razin (1997), who show empirically that high investment and large net inflows are significant 
in predicting reversals in net lending. 
20. Frankel and Schmukler (1996) provide evidence of asymmetric information in the case 
of Mexico, while Coval (1995) and Brennan and Cao (1997) analyze its implications. 
21. In a different context, but in a similar spirit, Lewis  (1989) analyzes the process of 
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In general there could be incomplete information about all components 
of total return: the underlying distribution of p, the level of the tax T,  and 
the installation cost c. Although it does not matter much which of these 
is the source of incomplete information, we focus on uncertainty about T. 
This could come from a lack of knowledge about the extent of economic 
reforms and liberalization,  or uncertainty  about the success of macro- 
economic reforms. Although the government may announce that it has 
adopted far-reaching reforms, this may not fully convince foreign investors 
due to credibility problems. Given that investors only observe r,, they can- 
not infer precisely the level of T. Over time, however, investors continu- 
ously update their perception of T by observing r,. They find out the actual 
value of T  in the long run. This is similar to models of monetary policy 
credibility, whereby credibility is gradually established based on observed 
inflation rates, although there the government’s policy is not always exoge- 
nous and changes with its reputationz2 
Consider the following experiment. Assume that  the tax rate in the 
emerging market is reduced permanently from T  = 5 to T = 0 at time 0.23 
The government announces the reduction, but investors only give partial 
credibility to the announcement. Their prior is that with probability 0.5 T 
has dropped to zero and with the same probability 0.5 it remains 5. Based 
on actual returns investors continuously  update these probabilities. We 
introduce this feature in the model described above and assume that there 
is  only  one  emerging market  and one  industrialized  country,  so  J  = 
Let p,  be the probability investors attach to T  = 0. At time t investors 
observe x  = p,  ,-  T. Through Bayesian learning, they update the probabil- 
ity that T = 0 as follows: 
N = 1.24 
22. See for example Backus and Driffill(1985a,  198513). Persson (1988) and Rogoff (1987, 
1989) provide surveys. In the context of international capital flows, Chari and Kehoe (1997) 
also consider a model with imperfect government credibility to explain capital flow volatility. 
But they rely on heterogeneity giving rise to herding. Investors decide sequentially whether 
to lend or not, which can give rise to informational cascades. We  assume instead a simple 
representative agent framework, where everyone decides simultaneously how much to lend. 
23. It would be far more difficult to analyze a gradual liberalization with learning. 
24. Alternatively, we  could examine the case where P  remains at ? and investors give a 
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Here we  have used  the fact that  uncertainty  about T  is independent  of 
uncertainty about p  and p*.  The first order condition with respect to a is 
(12)  [-y(jL -  jL*-  cl)  + 0.5y2(2au2-  2(1 -  a>~*~)](p,+  (1 -  p,)eYa‘) 
+ (I -  pl)eyolTy?  = 0. 
Substituting 
(13)  I, =  K, - (I - S)K,_, =  W +  aW* - (1 - 6)K,_, 
into equation (12) we have a nonlinear equation in a.  We solve this numer- 
ically. Equation (1  3) then gives us the investment rate, and therefore next 
period’s capital stock. By  subtracting 6 W we derive capital inflows. 
An interesting feature of the model is that investors tend to pull out of 
a market that has faced a bad return as this signals a possibly high value 
of T. Without incomplete information this is not what we would expect to 
happen. In that case a low return today (low value of p)  does not lead to 
a lower expected return tomorrow. The opposite could even be the case. 
During the recent Asian crisis we have seen a sharp drop in asset prices. To 
the extent that these prices dropped more than based on expected future 
dividends (the bursting of a bubble), it would lead to even higher expected 
returns for investors, which should lead to capital inflows. But instead we 
have witnessed  large capital outflows. Our incomplete information story 
may play an important role here. 
We  simulate by drawing randomly from the normal distributions of p 
and p*.  After each draw the probability p,  is updated according to equa- 
tion (10). Subsequently a,  and l,  are solved from equations (12) and (13). 
We still set ;i: = 0.05, c = 0.05, 6 = 0.07, u = 0.05, u* = 0.09, and p* = 
0.07. We  assume that  W = 20 and W* = 80, so that total wealth is still 
100. The expected return on emerging market capital is set at p = 0.083, 
so that again investment in emerging market equity is zero before the liber- 
alization. 
Each random draw gives a different  profile of capital flows. In figure 
3.10 we  show two random simulations. The behavior  of capital flows is 
strikingly similar to the actual experience of various countries as shown 
in figure 3.7. Beyond this general impression, we can draw several conclu- 
sions from these results. First, incomplete information reduces the extent 
of overshooting. Without uncertainty about 7  there should be an instanta- 
neous increase in capital inflows followed by a gradual decline to the new Liberalization,  Overshooting, and Volatility  89 
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(two simulations) 
steady-state value. In both simulations the initial increase is much smaller 
than it would be without uncertainty about T.  The reason is that investors 
are not sure in the beginning that T has actually dropped, while in steady 
state they know that it has dropped to zero. Second, incomplete informa- 
tion can generate substantial volatility. A series of negative outcomes for 
Y,  followed by  a series of positive outcomes implies huge swings in the 
first periods. Third, volatility declines over time as investors learn. This is 
reassuring for liberalizing economies as more stability ahead can be ex- 
pected, as long as the other sources of uncertainty are not increasing. A 
fourth conclusion is  that a simple model with a representative rational 
investor can easily explain the observed volatility, so that it is not neces- 
sary to rely on more sophisticated stories or models, such as informational 
cascades (see, e.g., Chari and Kehoe 1997) or multiple equilibria stories. 
Finally, the two simulations show that it is very easy to generate various 
profiles of capital flows. One should therefore not take too seriously spe- 
cific simulations, including ours. 
The model with incomplete information can easily be extended to gen- 
erate contagion across countries.25  Consider the same experiment as above 
of a partially  credible decrease in  T,  but assume that several emerging 
25. See Chuhan, Perez-Quiros, and Popper (1996), Calvo and Reinhart (1995), or Eichen- 
green, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) for some evidence on contagion. See also Agtnor (1997) 
and Agtnor and Aizenman (1997) for models consistent with the observed contagion. 90  Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop 
countries liberalize at  the same time. Moreover,  assume that  investors 
think (rightly or not) that events in one emerging country provide informa- 
tion about other countries. Thus, a very low return rIl  in country i will lead 
to a decline in the subjective probability that T, = 0, but it will also lead 
to declines in other countries. In this case we  may observe a large decline 
in inflows to country i accompanied by  declines in other countries. The 
extent of the declines in other countries will depend on the informational 
value attributed by investors to country i’s return. This value will probably 
vary across countries. For example, a negative shock in Thailand may pro- 
vide more informational value (in the eyes of the investors) about other 
Southeast Asian countries than a shock in Mexico. 
3.4  Steady-State Capital Flows 
An important question is to what extent developing countries can rely 
on foreign capital in the long run. Another natural question is how current 
capital inflows compare with their long-run values. These issues have been 
raised in section 3.1, where we used our estimates of long-run flows in fig- 
ures 3.6 and 3.7. In this section we  derive the steady-state values by con- 
sidering a very simple model in the same line as the one presented in the 
previous sections. 
By  “steady state” we  mean that emerging economies are perfectly inte- 
grated into international capital markets, or at least as much as industrial- 
ized countries are (defined below). This implies that, in contrast to the 
previous sections, there are also capital outflows from emerging market 
economies,. Moreover, we assume no net capital flows and focus on gross 
capital inflows to emerging economies. First, consider a situation where 
all investors, of both emerging markets and industrialized countries, hold 
perfectly diversified portfolios. Assuming for simplicity that there is only 
one good, so that the real return of an asset is the same for all investors, 
and that there is no nontradable human capital, everyone holds the same 
portfolio.26  Since the demand for assets equals supply, it follows that the 
fraction of each investor’s portfolio allocated to a particular country is 
equal to the capital stock of that country relative to the world capital stock. 
This benchmark of perfect diversification, however, is grossly violated 
in the data due to the well-known home bias. Figure 3.1 1 shows for four 
industrialized countries the fraction of their equity portfolio currently in- 
vested at home and what fraction they would have invested at home under 
the perfect diversification ben~hmark.~’  Based on the equilibrium under 
26. See Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996) and Baxter and Jermann (1997) for an 
analysis of the effects of human capital on portfolio choice; and see Pesenti and van Wincoop 
(1998) and Baxter, Jermann, and King (1998) for the role of  nontraded  goods. Here we 
abstract from these complications. 
27. The data are from Tesar and Werner (1997). Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility  91 
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perfect diversification discussed above, the benchmark fraction invested 
at home is equal to the value of the domestic stock market divided by the 
value of the global stock market. It is clear that we are still very far from 
a world of peifect diversification. In 1996, U.S. investors allocated 90 per- 
cent of their portfolio toward domestic shares. This would have been only 
slightly over 40 percent under perfect diversification. British investors cur- 
rently allocate 78 percent toward domestic assets, but would have invested 
10 percent at home under the benchmark. The bias is even stronger for 
German and Canadian investors. 
It is therefore necessary to take the home bias into account. Without 
trying to understand what drives this bias, we  simply assume that a frac- 
tion + of each country’s capital stock is nontradable and owned by domes- 
tic investors. The remainder of their wealth is perfectly diversified. The 
portfolio of the “tradable” wealth is the same for all investors, so that for 
a country i in equilibrium 
J 
,=I  (1 - +)q  =  C.l,(W, - +y>.  (14) 
Here J now refers to the total number  of countries, not just emerging 
markets, and W,  is the wealth of country j.  Since Z W, = ZK, = K“  is the 
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So even when we allow for home bias, for the well-diversified component 
of portfolios  we  still find that  the fraction invested in  country  i corre- 
sponds to the ratio of  that country’s capital stock to the world capital 
stock. We will focus on this ratio instead of the actual quantity of inflows 
as it is independent of the home bias coefficient 4. This is somewhat less 
informative, but we  still have little understanding of the potential evolu- 
tion of the home bias in the long run. 
Now consider a particular emerging market i and the sum of claims on 
the rest of the world by all countries other than i. We would like to know 
what fraction of those claims is invested in country  i.  Making the addi- 
tional assumption that  W, = Kj,  which holds approximately in the data, 
we find that the fraction of external claims by  other countries that is in- 
vested in country i equals 
j#l 
We only need a measure of the capital stock of all countries in order to 
compute this fraction for individual countries. We obtain this measure by 
extending the estimates of King and Levine (1994) for all seventeen emerg- 
ing markets plus  twenty-one  industrialized  countries.28  We  assume our 
“world” is made up of the sum of these thirty-eight countries. 
It is hard to directly compare this to the data since for many countries, 
particularly the emerging markets, we do not have good data on the out- 
standing stocks of assets and liabilities. However, we  can apply the same 
measure to flow data as well. If we assume, as we did in sections 3.2 and 
3.3, that the rate of depreciation 6 is the same for all countries, in steady 
state all flows are proportional to the corresponding stock, with propor- 
tionality factor 6. Therefore in steady state equation (16) should also be 
equal to capital inflows into country i divided by all capital outflows from 
countries other than i.  This is shown in figure 3.7, where the horizontal 
line in each of the graphs is the steady state measure equation (16). Figure 
3.6 shows the steady state for the sum of all emerging markets. 
These estimates are clearly based on a set of strong assumptions. For 
28. King and Levine (1994) estimate capital stock data until 1988 based on Summers and 
Heston (1991) investment data and using a perpetual inventory method. We  use the same 
methodology and the updated Summers and Heston data (Mark 5.6) to extend the capital 
stock data until  1992. In a couple of countries we  estimated the 1991 or 1992 investment 
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example, we  assume that all countries grow at the same rate. It would be 
useful to refine the analysis and extend the basic model in various direc- 
tions. In any case, two conclusions arise from figures 3.6 and 3.7. First, at 
the aggregate  level only FDI plus portfolio flows briefly rose above the 
steady-state level during the recent lending boom. Although the picture is 
perfectly  consistent  with  the  overshooting  story of  section  3.2, capital 
flows remain below the steady state. We can think of this as lowering 7, 
but not to zero. Many countries still have significant restrictions on capital 
flows. Moreover, all the liberalizations did not take place at the same time. 
Alternatively, there may have been uncertainty about 7 as in section 3.3. 
Second, figure 3.7 shows that for many  of the individual countries the 
inflows reached significantly above the steady-state level and then returned 
to close to that level. Examples are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and 
Thailand. 
3.5  Conclusions 
The recent increase in capital flows to emerging markets and its associ- 
ated volatility generates difficulties for policy makers and academics alike. 
In this paper we  hope to have contributed to a better understanding  of 
the issues. We adopt a global perspective of capital flows, considering the 
whole set of industrialized and emerging countries, rather than focusing 
on a specific set of countries. We take the view that there has been a wave 
of financial liberalizations and other reforms making it much more attrac- 
tive to invest in emerging markets. We  show that by  using a simple and 
rather standard model, we can easily reproduce the main features of capi- 
tal inflows to kmerging markets: overshooting, volatility, and contagion. 
The model can also account for the overshooting of asset prices. Our re- 
sults show that it is not necessary to rely on irrational or herding behavior 
of investors to explain these features. Moreover, we  provide estimates of 
long-run capital inflows and compare them with actual flows, which pro- 
vides useful information about crisis situations. 
While our analysis identifies some basic mechanisms related to capital 
flows, it abstracts from many other important factors. First, we need to 
better understand the problems associated with the absorption of the capi- 
tal inflows. In this context the role of the financial sector, ignored in our 
model, is particularly  important. Several of the issues mentioned  in the 
debate about the Southeast Asian crisis could be incorporated in our anal- 
ysis. For example, capital flow volatility may be exacerbated in presence 
of mechanisms leading to “overlending” by financial institutions, as in Mc- 
Kinnon and Pill (1997) or Dooley (1997). Another source of exacerbation 
would come from the role of maturity transformation of financial inter- 
mediaries as in  Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (see Goldfajn  and Valdis 
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Second, the capital inflows and outflows themselves generate significant 
turbulence in emerging market economies, affecting, among other things, 
asset prices, economic activity, and the exchange rate. This turbulence in 
turn affects capital flows. We have ignored such feedback channels in our 
model. For example, Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (1999) show that 
the interaction of capital flows and real exchange rate movements can 
generate considerable volatility in presence of capital markets imperfec- 
tions. Finally, it would be useful to distinguish between the various types 
of liberalization and reform and more explicitly model the behavior of the 
government in this context. 
Combining some of the above elements with our analysis may help elu- 
cidate why capital flow reversals are most often associated with a crisis. 
For example, is it due to policies that are inconsistent with a decline in 
inflows, such as a fixed exchange rate? Or is it due to some other funda- 
mental characteristics linked for example to financial intermediation and 
lending to emerging markets firms? Finding an answer to these questions 
is obviously highly relevant to policymaking. Our understanding of these 
issues remains limited, however, and much further work should be done. 
Appendix 
This  appendix  derives the optimal  investment  in  an emerging market 
based on equation (3).  For convenience we  omit the time subscript. With 
cij the proportion of the portfolio invested in emerging market j,  the total 
proportion invested in emerging markets is (Y = Z;=lar  Define the vectors 
a' = (al,  a2,  . . . ,  aJ)  and r = (rl, r2, . . . ,  rJ).  Then total return R  can be 
written as 
('41) 
and its expectation is 
R  =  a'r  + (1 - a)p*, 
E(R) =  a'r  + (1 - cx)jL*, 
where P = E(r).  Define the following J  X J variance-covariance matrix: 
 PEE^^  pmu2  .'. u2 
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var(R)  =  a’Xa + (1 - aj2u2,+ 241 - a)pEDuu*, 
where a;  = (~/N)u*~  + (1 -  (l/N)pDD 
Using 
the first order conditions to equation (3) for all i are 
where 
Aggregating equation (A2), we  have 
(A31  a/J  =  X, +  x,(Y  - E*), 
where x, = P,/(l -  JP,) and x,  = &/(I  -  JP,). Substituting back into 
equation (A2), 
(A41  a!  =  x2  +  x3((  - jT*), 
where x, = PI + P2a and xj = Po. When the tax rate is the same across 
emerging markets, the differential equation for the capital stock (equation 
[7])  and the solution (equation  [S]) for capital inflows are still the same, 
now using the more general expressions for xo  and xI.  As before, when 
one emerging country changes its tax rate, holding the average tax rate 
constant, xo,  xl,  and T, replaced by x2,  x3,  and T,~. 96  Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop 
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Comment  Carmen M. Reinhart 
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of financial liberalization in 
emerging markets on the dynamics of capital flows to these countries. By 
positing a cost of absorbing these flows, the authors explain how liber- 
alization can give  rise to an “overshooting” of capital inflows and asset 
prices. In addition, the authors examine whether incomplete information 
can give rise to a high degree of volatility in  capital flows as well  as to 
contagion. They also suggest that deviations in capital inflows from their 
steady-state levels can be used as a potential signal of future crises. 
These are important questions to ask in light of the close linkages be- 
tween capital flows and financial crises. Furthermore, financial crises, par- 
ticularly in,the domestic banking sector, seem to be closely entwined with 
financial liberalization and asset price bubbles (see Kaminsky and Rein- 
hart 1999). The Asian crises of 1997-98  certainly attest to the relevance of 
these issues. Financial liberalization, full or partial, did appear to help 
explain the cycle of capital inflows and the prolonged lending boom that 
left these economies highly leveraged and, thus, vulnerable to financial 
crises. During the boom phase of the capital flow cycle, the ex post evi- 
dence is also consistent with an asset price overshooting of the type dis- 
cussed in this paper. 
In what follows, I will suggest that the analytical framework presented 
in this paper is extremely useful in understanding foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and portfolio equity flows to emerging markets in the 1990s. It is 
also useful for delineating how efforts to liberalize capital markets may 
have contributed to the boom phase of the capital flow cycle and its ulti- 
mate overshooting. The model also provides insights into FDI’s compar- 
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ative resilience vis-a-vis other types of  capital inflows following periods 
of turbulence. This resilience was evident following the Mexican crisis of 
1994-95  and the recent Asian crisis as well. This framework, however, is 
less well equipped to explain the surge in short-term capital flows, be these 
short-maturity bonds (as in  Mexico or Indonesia)  or bank  loans (as in 
Korea and Thailand) and their links to financial liberalization. Hence, the 
framework presented in this paper is, in my  view, a very relevant but par- 
tial explanation of the capital flow episode of the 1990s. 
I will divide my comments into two broad areas. The first briefly deals 
with the stylized facts alluded to in the paper, while the second focuses on 
the theoretical model. 
The Stylized Facts 
Section 3.1 of the paper provides some background information on the 
evolution of capital flows to emerging markets in the 1990s. This section 
highlights the increasing importance of portfolio flows to emerging mar- 
kets and the role of  FDI. These and other points made by  the authors 
are indeed important, but some qualifications of the stylized evidence, as 
presented in this paper, are in order. 
First,  while  FDI and portfolio  flows  did surge in the earlier part of 
this decade, the increase was not universal and much more pronounced 
in Latin America than in Asia. In the years prior to the crisis, short-term 
flows  to  Asia  surged,  as  Japanese  and  European  banks  significantly 
stepped up their lending to this region. Hence, in light of the paper’s goal 
of understanding the role financial liberalization plays in stimulating capi- 
tal inflows, the authors should also consider discussing the role  played 
by  short-term capital inflows during the period they are analyzing. Other 
papers, which have also modeled the financial liberalization process (see, 
e.g., Goldfajn and  Valdks  1995; McKinnon  and  Pill  1996) have  often 
stressed the distinctive behavior of banks during the postliberalization pe- 
riod. In particular, it has been shown that, during those periods, banks 
are inclined to acquire short-term offshore liabilities (capital inflows), that 
are then lent at home at substantially higher interest rates and longer ma- 
turities for a substantial profit. Certainly, the  severe liquidity problems 
that some Asian countries have faced in 1997-98  have only served to con- 
firm the prominent  role played by  short-maturity debt; the widespread 
incidence of  banking crises have also underscored the central role that 
banks play in intermediating capital inflows. The increasing skewness in 
the composition  of  capital flows toward the  short end  of  the maturity 
spectrum has also been linked to the vulnerability of the Asian economies 
of financial crises (see Kaminsky and Reinhart  1998). 
Second, a stylized fact, which is prominently stressed in the background 
discussion and filters through to the analytical framework, is the assertion 
that financial liberalization is  primarily a feature  of  the  1990s. Galbis 100  Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop 
(1993) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) provide detailed chronologies 
of the process of financial liberalization in most of the emerging market 
economies considered here. Financial liberalization was well underway in 
most of these countries by the early 1990s. Among the most documented 
of these financial reforms were the “big bang” liberalizations of the late 
1970s and early 1980s in the Southern Cone. More generally, the removal 
of interest rate ceilings and directed lending was an ongoing process in 
the 1980s for several of the Asian and Latin American emerging markets 
emphasized in this study. 
Third, the authors seem to suggest that financial liberalization has been 
synchronous across the broad  range  of highly  heterogeneous  emerging 
market economies in the  1990s, and thus liberalization  has been a key 
ingredient in the widespread flow of capital to emerging markets in the 
1990s. While I fully share the authors’ view of the key importance of fi- 
nancial liberalization as a pull factor, there is little evidence of such wide- 
spread cross-country synchronicity of reforms. By  the time Argentina and 
Brazil implemented macroeconomic  reforms, many of the Asian econo- 
mies now  in  trouble and Chile had been far advanced  in this process. 
China is particularly difficult to fit in this mold; neither its domestic fi- 
nancial sector nor its external accounts have been liberalized by any rea- 
sonable measure-its  currency lacks convertibility and its banking sector 
is bankrupt. A synchronous rise in flows to emerging markets may have 
other explanations than those that are stressed in this paper. Several stud- 
ies that have analyzed the determinants of capital flows to emerging mar- 
kets have found conclusive evidence on the importance of common push 
factors (see Montiel and Reinhart 1999 for a summary of this literature). 
Specifically, the decline in U.S. interest rates in the early part of the 1990s 
and the more dramatic march toward zero of Japanese short-term inter- 
est rates were clearly forces that helped propel capital toward Asia and 
Latin America. 
The Theoretical Model 
Let us recall that this paper aims to assess the impact of financial liber- 
alization in emerging markets on capital flows to these countries and to 
explain why  liberalization can give rise to the “overshooting” of capital 
inflows and asset prices. To do so, the authors begin by modeling financial 
liberalization as the reduction in a tax, which in turn increases the rate of 
return on physical capital in emerging markets. This approach seems quite 
sensible, since even in the absence of explicit policy decisions, one can re- 
interpret the reduction in this tax as the decline in transactions costs asso- 
ciated with new “information-age’’ technology. Furthermore, some coun- 
tries (like Chile and China) have gone to great lengths to encourage FDI 
through tax breaks and other forms of preferential treatment while shun- 
ning short-term and portfolio flows. Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility  101 
In what follows, my discussion of the model will mainly focus on why I 
think that this type of model is better suited to explain the behavior  of 
FDI and equity flows than the broader  capital flow dynamics that the 
authors discuss in the introduction. This is not to suggest that explaining 
FDI and equity flows is a trivial feat, since both FDI and portfolio equity 
flows showed marked increases in the 1990s. Also, while the authors do 
not actually interpret and exploit some of their findings in this light, this 
framework also allows us to understand  in an intuitively appealing man- 
ner the problem of “overinvestment” that characterized many of the Asian 
economies on the eve of crisis. 
The model, however, would have to be substantially amended to shed 
light on the issue of bond flows and other short-term flows, which were 
also extremely important in explaining the capital flow surge of the 1990s 
as well  as its subsequent volatility. To  understand  these  other types of 
flows, some of the assumptions that are made will have to be relaxed. For 
example,  it is assumed that capital outflows from emerging markets are 
not  possible-investment  is  assumed  to  be  “irreversible.”  Table  3C. 1 
clearly highlights that  reversibility  of capital flows is a major  issue for 
emerging markets. Nor is this issue a new one, as the experiences of the 
early 1980s shown in the table highlight. However, it is true that not all 
capital flows are equally vulnerable to these abrupt reversals. Indeed, the 
kind of physical capital flows that the authors model in this paper (FDI) 
appear to be relatively resilient following the Mexican 1994 crisis and the 
Asian crises of  1997-98.  Bond flows and foreign bank loans, which are 
Table 3C.1  Selected Large Reversals in Net Private Capital Flows (as a percentage 
of GDP) 































Source; Calvo and Reinhart (1 999). 
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not  included in this model, appear to account for the bulk  of  the ob- 
served reversals. 
It is also the case that the authors work with a real model, in which 
there is no money, credit, nor exchange rates. There is also no debt. The in- 
troduction of a second emerging market asset, be it money, debt, or both, 
would clearly allow for a more comprehensive modeling of  the capital 
flows of the 1990s. While there are always trade-offs between tractability 
and breadth, to understand the capital flows of the 1990s we must also ad- 
dress the issue of debt and bank lending. As we have seen in the cases of 
Southeast Asia and Korea, bond financing and bank loans accounted for 
an important share of capital inflows to this region as well as other emerg- 
ing markets. 
A less pressing, but possibly interesting, extension of  this framework 
would be  to relax the assumption that consumption decisions are taken 
on a period-by-period basis. The reason that this may be a fruitful exercise 
has to do with the authors’ introduction of incomplete information and 
learning. While I very much like their idea of incomplete information as a 
possible source of volatility and contagion, this uncertainty is not (in its 
present form) allowed to feed back so as to affect consumption decisions. 
In sum, if the authors wish to address the links between financial liberal- 
ization, aggregate capital flows, asset price bubbles, and volatility, I would 
urge them to incorporate other assets, besides physical capital, in  their 
framework. An interesting extension of this type of analysis could also be 
to build on the financial liberalization story and incorporate a financial 
intermediary, as in Edwards and Vegh  (1997) and Krugman (1998). Of 
course, attempting to do too many of these things in a single model will 
no doubt prove messy but it would be highly complementary to the inter- 
esting issues that are already addressed in the paper. 
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